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[L. A. No. 23276. In Bank. June 6. 1956.] 
BERTHA J. MESSENGER, Appellant, v. THOMAS T. 
MESSENGER. Respondent. 
[1] Husband and Wife-Property Settlement Agreements-Inter-
pretation.-Labels adopted by the parties to a property settle-
ment agreement, such as that the monthly payments provided 
therein are alimony, are not conclusive, and it is not con· 
trolling that monthly payments for support have some of 
the indicia of alimony. 
[2a,2b] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of 
Parties.-Husband and wife made a provision for support an 
integral part of their property settlement agreement where 
they not only entered into the agreement "for the purpose of 
fixing and adjusting their personal and property rights" but 
made the provision for support "an inseparable part of the 
consideration for the property settlement" by expressly agree-
ing that the support and maintenance provided in one para-
graph, like the division of property provided in other para-
graphs, was "for and in consideration of the permanent and 
lasting division and settlement of all their property rights 
of every kind and nature, whether separate or community 
property." 
[lJ See CaI.Jur.2d, Husband and Wife, § 63 j Am.Jur., Husband 
and Wife, § 318 et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 217; Am.Jur., 
Divorce and Separation, § 586 et seq. 
Mclt. Dig. References: [1, 4, 5] Husband and Wife, § 157(6); 
[2, 3, 8J Divorce, § 203; [6) Husband and Wife, § 157(4); [7] 
Divorce, §§ 216, 234(2); [9] Divorce, §§ 249, 265; [10] Divorce, 
§ 249. 
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[3a, Sb] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties. 
-Where provisions for support and maintenance of wife are 
an integral and inseverable part of a property settlement 
agreement, her express promise not to seek alimony other 
than as provided in such agreement cannot be abrogated with-
out changing the agreement; and since such waiver is part of 
the consideration for the husband's agreement to make the 
support payments, he likewise cannot seek a modification 
thereof without changing the property settlement agreement. 
[4] Husband and Wife-Property Settlement Agreements-Inter-
pretation.-In the absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence as 
to the meaning of a property settlement agreement, the trial 
court's interpretation is not binding on the Supreme Court. 
[5] Id.-Property Settlement Agreements - Interpretation.-For 
the purpose of determining the meaning of a property settle-
ment agreement, the value of accounts receivable assigned to 
the husband that is material is the value estimated by the 
parties in their agreement, not the value estimated by the 
court three years later. 
[6] Id.-Property Settlement Agreements-Consideration.-Since 
at the time a property settlement agreement is made, the 
parties may be uncertain as to which of their property is 
community rather than separate, and they will ordinarily not 
know how the court in a divorce action will find the facts or 
how it would, in the absence of an acceptable agreement, exer-
cise its discretion in dividing the property and awarding ali-
mony, the amicable adjustment of these doubtful questions 
with respect to property and support and maintenance rights 
of the parties may alone supply sufficient consideration to 
support their entire agreement. 
[7] Divorce - Permanent Alimony - Modification of Allowance: 
Disposition of Community Property.-Where plaintiff secured 
her divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty, had the parties 
not settled their rights by agreement the court in its dis-
cretion could have awarded plaintiff all of the community 
property and less alimony than she received under the agree-
ment, in which ease the alimony would be subject to reduction 
in the event of changed circumstances. 
[8] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.-
A wife is entitled to agree to an equal division of community 
property in exchange for support and maintenance provisions 
that cannot be reduced; accordingly, the fact that community 
property is substantially dividefl equally has no bearing on the 
validity of the provision of the ngreement whereby both parties 
waive all rigbts to support and mnintenanee otber than as pro-
vided therein. 
[9] Id.-Enforcement of Awards-Execution: Contempt.-Where 
there was evidence that defendant had been. twice married 
) 
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after his divorce from plaintiff, that he had no assets other 
than the income from his medical practice on which an execu-
tion for delinquent support installments could be levied, and 
that he had suffered a partial stroke necessitating loss of time 
from his practice, the trial court was justified in finding that 
defendant "while in arrears, is not in contempt of (:ourt," 
and in conditionally suspending the issuance of a writ of execu-
tion. 
[10] ld.-Enforcement of Awards,Execution.-Under Civ. Code, 
§ 139, as amended in 1951, the trial court has discretion to de-
termine whether execution is an appropriate remedy for en-
forcing its order for support payments to a wife granted a 
divorce for the husband's offense, and it was not an abuse of 
discretion to condition the issuance of execution on the hus-
bllud's noncompliance with an order to discharge arrearages 
in installments where the court found on sufficient evidence 
that to permit the issuance and enforcement of a writ of 
execution would discredit the husband professionally and im-
pair his ability to make the monthly payments and discharge 
the arrearages. 
APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Superior Court 
of Kings County purporting to amend a property settlement 
agreement, holding defendant not in contempt of court, and 
suspending issuance of execution. Clark Clement, Judge. 
Part of judgment amending provisions of property settlement 
agreement and interlocutory judgment based thereon, 
reversed j other parts of judgment and order appealed from, 
affirmed. 
Sidney J. W. Sharp, Herbert M. Braden and Lawrence W. 
Clawson for Appellant. 
Daniel M.. Fadenrecht for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff and defendant were married in 
1936 and separated in 1950. On January 3, 1951, they exe-
cuted a property settlement agreement. Thereafter plaintiff 
filed a complaint for divorce. and on January 8, 1951, an 
interlocutory decree was granted to her on the ground of 
extreme ~rueIty. The decree approved and incorporated by 
reference the provisions of the agreement and expressly 
ordered defendant to pay $500 per month "as agreed in said 
property settlement agreement." The final decree was entered 
t'>n January 16, 1952. 
) 
) 
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In December, 1953, plaintiff applied for an order of execu 
tion for claimed arrearages of $6,700 plus interest and secure 
an order to show cause why defendant should not be held i 
contempt for failing to make the overdue payments. De 
fendant then secured an order to show cause why the pay 
ments provided for in the decree should not be reduced 
$300 per month. The three matters were heard together, and 
the trial court entered judgment reducing the monthly pay-
ments and finding that defendant was not in contempt for 
failure to make the overdue payments. The court also con-
cluded that an execution should not be issued against the 
defendant, on the grounds that he "has no properties or 
monies against which such execution could be successfully 
levied, that the only manner in which such execution could 
be served would be by placing a constable in charge of the 
daily receipts of the defendant; and, as the defendant is a! 
professional man, this Court finds that such an action would, 
result in considerable discredit to the defendant; and the' 
court further believes that, if such action were taken, that the. 
earning ability of the defendant [as a physician and surgeon] 
would be reduced to such a degree that it would materially 
dect the ability of the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the 
reduced alimony as set by this Court." The court ordered that 
the property settlement agreement be amended to provide 
for the payment of $375 per month, and income tax on an: 
income of $4,500 per year instead of $500 per month and in-" 
come tax on an income of $6,000 per year. It found that the . 
amount due plamtiff from defendant to March 10, 1954, was 
$5,668 and ordered defendant to pay $800 on or before that • 
date and $50 per month in addition to the reduced alimony:' 
payments to be applied on the balance due. The issuance of j 
execution was suspended so long as defendant made these pay-"': 
ments, but in the event of default, an execution was to issue j 
forthwith. 1 
Plaintiff appeals. She contends that the provisions fori 
monthly payments and income tax payments were an integral 
and inseparable part of the property settlement agreement 1 
of the parties and are therefore not subject to modification. 1 
In their agreement the parties provided: ;{t 
"WHEREAS, the parties hereto are husband and wife, and J 
. ~ 
that said parties hereto have agreed to divide all property 
and property rights between them; and 
"WHEREAS, said parties do not make any arrangement orA 
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parties to this agreement, leaving the determination of such 
action to the Court, but make and enter into this agreement 
for the purpose of fixing and adjusting their personal and 
property rights; and 
"WHEREAS, the [husband] has represented that he has fully 
disclosed to the [ wife] aU of the community property of 
every kind and nature, and that the same is being and has 
been divided as between the parties under the terms and con-
ditions of this agreement as hereinafter set forth. 
"Now THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the perma-
nent and lasting division and settlement of all their prop-
erty rights of every kind and nature, whether separate or 
community property, they hereby mutually covenant and 
agree, each with the other as follows, to wit:" 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 then provided for a division of the 
property, and in the present proceeding the trial court found 
that plaintiff received property worth $32,850 and that de-
fendant received property worth $31,375. 
Paragraph 3 provided" That the husband agrees to pay to 
the wife for her care, maintenance and support, the sum of 
FIVE HUNDRED ($500.00) DOLLARS per month, payable monthly 
in advance, commencing on January 3rd, 1951, receipt of 
which first month's alimony is hereby acknowledged, such 
obligation to pay to continue until the wife dies or remarries." 
Paragraph 15 provided "That the husband agrees that 
from date hereof he will pay to the wife a sufficient amount 
over and above the FIVE HUNDRED ($500.00) DOLLARS per 
month alimony, herein agreed to be paid, to pay the income 
tax, if any, to be paid by the wife on said alimony pay-
ment .... " 
The agreement also provided that "It is further understood 
and agreed that the wife waives, relinquishes, abandons, and 
releases aU of her right, title and interest in and to any and all 
property which is hereinbefore agreed shall be set apart to 
and become the property of the husband, and to any and all 
property of every nature which said husband now has or that 
he may hereafter acquire or own, and all right to future 
maintenance and support from or by the said husband, ex-
cept as herein otherwise expressly provided, and hereby 
waives, relinquishes and releases all right to inherit any prop-
erty whatsoever which said husband now owns or possesses 
or which he may hereafter own or possess, or of which he may 
die seized or possessed, and all property which is hereinbefore 
) 
) 
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----~----------------------------------------"' . .,f; 
set apart to him shall be and remain forever as between the ': 
parties hereto the separate property of the husband." . A • 
similar provision related to the husband, except that his waiver· 
of aU right to future support and maintenance was not quali-
fied by the clause, "except as herein otherwise expressly 
provided. " 
Plaintiff's complaint referred to the $500 per month pay-
ments as alimony and prayed that the court approve the 
property settlement agreement, make it part of the decree, 
and order defendant to pay $500 per month "for the care, 
maintenance and support of the plaintiff, as therein agreed. ''. 
The interlocutory decree approved the agreement, made it 
part of the decree by reference, and expressly ordered de- . 
fendant to pay $500 per month "for the care, maintenance 
and support of the plaintiif, as agreed in said property settle- . 
ment agreement." The final decree provided that "It is·. 
further ordered and decreed that wherein said interlocutory 
decree makes any provision for alimony" said provision "be 
and the same is hereby made binding on the parties affected 
thereby the same as if herein set forth in full, and that 
wherein said interlocutory decree relates to the property of 
the parties hereto, said property be and the same is hereby 
assigned in accordance with the terms thereof to the parties 
therein declared to be entitled thereto. 
"IT Is FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the ; 
community property of the parties hereto is ordered divided, ,; 
in accordance with the property settlement agreement ap- .. 
proved in the Interlocutory Decree entered herein and the ~. 
order for support payments as are provided for therein are 
hereby ratified and confirmed." 3l Since the final decree merely confirms the provisions of , 
the interlocutory decree and the property settlement agree- , 
ment, and since the interlocutory decree ordered that the pay- .;1 
ments be made "as agreed in said property settlement agree- j 
ment, If we must examine the agreement to determine whether ~ 
the provisions for monthly payments and income tax pay-
ments are separable from the provisions that divide thej 
property, or whether they are an integral and inseparable : 
part of the division of property and therefore an inseparable ! 
part of the consideration for the property settlement. If 
they faU into the latter category they cannot now be modified. 
(Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Cal.2d 36. 40-41 [265 P.2d 873] j Adams 
v. Adams, 29 Ca1.2d 621, 625 [177 P.2d 265].) 
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within the former category defendant stresses the fact that 
the monthly payments for the wife's support are expressly 
referred to in paragraphs l(h),l 3,2 and 158 as alimony and 
have one of the principal characteristics of alimony in that 
they terminate if the wife dies or remarries. Similar con-
tentions were rejected in Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Ca1.2d 36, 41 
[265 P.2d 873]4 and in Fox v. Fox, 42 Ca1.2d 49, 52-53 [265 
P .2d 881], Ii where it was pointed out that the labels adopted by 
S"It is understood and agreed as to this policy [life insurance] that 
if, due to financial reverses or other reasons beyond the control of the 
husband, it is necessary to borrow money thereon for the purpose of 
paying the alimony hereinafter agreed to be paid by the husband, but 
for no other purpose, the husband may borrow on said policy for the 
purpose of paying said alimony. but for no other purpose •••• " (Italics 
added.) 
a, • That the husband agrees to pay to the wife for her eare, mainte-
nance and support. the sum of FIVE HUNDRED (.500.00) DOLLARS per 
month, payable monthly in advance. commencing on January Srd, 1951. 
receipt of which first month '8 alimony is hereby acknowledged, BUeh 
obligation to pay to coutinue until the wife dies or remarries. I I (ItaJ1es 
added.) 
"'That the husband agrees that from date hereof he will pay to the 
wife a su1Iicient amount over and above the FIVE HUNDRED ($500.00) 
DOLLAJI.S per month alimony, herein agreed to be paid, to pay the in-
come tax, if any, to be paid by the wife on said alimony payment .••• " 
(Italics added.) 
o"Plaintiff contends. however, that since the monthly payments were 
to terminate on her death or remarriage and were described as alimony 
in the prayer of her complaint, they should be so treated. She points out 
that if they were intended as a division of property it would have been 
more reasonable for the agreement to provide that they should continue 
until a given amount had been paid_ 'rhese considerations would be more 
persuasive if the issue presented was whether, on the one hand, the 
monthy payments were 801ely part of a division of the community prop· 
erty, or, on the other hand, solely alimony. When, as in this case, how-
ever, the parties have made the provision for BUpport and maintenance 
an integral part of their property settlement agreement, the monthly 
payments will ordinarily have a dual character. To the extent that 
they are designed to discharge the obligation of support and maintenance 
they will ordinarily re:8ect the r.haraeteristics of that obligation and thus 
have the indicia of alimony. [Citations.] On the other hand, to the 
extent that they represent a division of the community property itself, 
or constitute an inseparable part ot the consideration for the property 
settlement, they are not alimony, and accordingly cannot be modilled 
without changing the terms of the property settlement agreement of the 
parties. I' 
·"Plaintiff contends, however, that since the payments were labeled 
alimony, were to cease on her remarriage, and were subject to modifica-
tion in the event of a reduction of dE'fendant's pension, there is evidence 
to support the trial court'. implied finding that they were 801ely alimony 
aubject to modification ...• The labels adopted by the parties are 
not conclusive, since the agreement must be considered as a whole. [Cita· 
tions.] Moreover, as pointed out in the Dexter ease, to the extent the 
626 MESSENGER V. MESSENGER [46 C.1a 
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the parties are not conclusive and that it is not controlling thai 
the monthly payments for support have some of the indicia 
of alimony. . 
[2aJ In this case as in Fox v. Fox, supra, Dexter v. Dexter, 
supra, Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Ca1.2d 55, 60-61 [265 P.2d 865], 
and Finnegan v. Finnegan, 42 Ca1.2d 762,765 [269 P.2d 873], 
the parties have made the provision for support an integral 
part of their property settlement agreement. Not only did 
they" enter into this agreement for the purpose of fixing and 
adjusting their personal and property rights" but they made: 
the provisions for support ., an inseparable part of the con- ' 
sideration for the property settlement" (Dexter v. Dexter, 
supra, at pp. 41-42) by expressly agreeing that the support 
and maintenance provided in paragraph 3, like the division 
of property provided in paragraphs 1 and 2, was "for 
and in consideration of the permanent and lasting division and 
settlement of all their property rights of every kind and 
nature, whether separate or community property .... " . 
[3aJ Moreover, as in Fox v. Fox, supra, at page 52, the 
wife waived "all right to future maintenance and support . 
from or by the said husband, except as herein otherwise pro-
vided," i.e., in paragraph 3. Her express promise not to seek 
alimony except as provided in the agreement could not "be 
abrogated without changing the property settlement agree-
ment of the parties." (Ibid.) Similarly, since this waiver, 
was part of the consideration for the husband's agreement to i 
make the support payments, he likewise could not seek a ' 
modification thereof without changing the property settle-' 
ment agreement of the parties. It is clear, therefore, that if., 
the parties meant the maintenance and support provisions to ,I 
be alimony separable from a division of the property they~' 
would not have included this waiver (see H elvern v. H eIve"" ~ 
139 Ca1.App.2d 819, 829-830 [294 P.2d 482]), for an order •. ~ 
allowing alimony is subject to revision at any time. (Hough] 
v. Hough, 26 CaI.2d 605,612 [160 P.2d 15].)';; 
[4J In the absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence as tog 
the meaning of the agreement, the trial court's interpreta- '1 
tion of it is not binding on this court. (Fox v. Fox, 42 Cal. I 
2d 49, 52 [265 P.2d 88]]; Estate of Platt, 2] Ca1.2d 343, 352 
[131 P .2d 825].) The evidence offered and introduced in ~ 
this case was concerned primarily with defendant's ability to 
monthly payments are designed to discharge the obligation of support 
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pay, his various expenditures, his financial arrangements with 
his father, and with the money and other property the hus-
band and wife received under the agreement. The only ex-
trinsic evidenec offered that had any bearing on the meanin~ 
of the property settlement agreement was that showing tbe 
value of the property received by the parties. Proof that de-
fendant received the greater part of the community property 
would be some indication that the support provisions were in 
lieu of part of plaintiff's share of the community property. 
There are two reasons, however, why the trial court's finding 
that defendant did not receive the greater part of the com-
munity property does not support its conclusion that the 
support provisions were not part of the consideration for 
the division of the property and were therefore subject to 
modifica tion. 
[6] (1.) That finding was based on a reevaluation of the 
accounts receivable assigned to defendant under the agree· 
ment. In the agreement the parties estimated the value of 
the accounts at $15,000. The trial court estimated their value 
at $5,000. It is obvious that for the purpose of determining 
the meaning of the agreement, the value that IS material is the 
value estimated by the parties in their a!,.rreement, not the 
valne estimated by the court three years later. 
(2.) Even if the evidence had showed that when the parties 
made their agreement, they understood that plaintiff would 
receive property worth $32,850 and defendant would receive 
property worth $31,375, it would not support the conclusion 
that the payments were subject to modification. The agree· 
ment was for a "permanent and lasting division" of all 
their rights in separate as well as community property. 
[6] As stated in Dexter v. Dexter, (supra, at p. 43) "[A 1t 
the time a property settlement is made, the parties may be 
uncertain as to which of their property is community rather 
than separate, and they will ordinarily not know how the court 
in the divorce action will find the facts or how it would, in 
the absence of an acceptable agreement, exercise its discretion 
in dividing tlle property and awarding alimony. The amicable 
adjustment of these doubtful questions with respect to the 
property aud support and maintenance rig11ts of the parties 
may alone supply sufficient consideration to support their 
entire agreement. r Citation.] Thus in the ;>resent case, the 
parties recited that they desired to settle their property and 
support and maintenance rights 'by friendly agreement, in-
stead of resorting to court for said purpose.' [7] Moreover, 
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since plainti1f secured her divorce on the ground of extreme 
cruelty, had the parties not settled their rights by agree-
ment, the court could in its discretion have awarded plaintiff 
all of the community property and less alimony than she 
received under her agreement. In such case, however, the 
alimony would be subject to reduction in the event of changed 
circumstances. [8] Plaintiff was entitled to agree instead to 
an equal division of the community property in exchange for 
support and maintenance payments that could not be reduced. 
Accordingly, the fact that the community property was 
divided equally has no bearing on the validity of the provision 
of the agreement whereby both parties waived all rights to 
support and maintenance other than as provided therein. 
[Citations.]" In the present case the very fact that the find- I 
ing of the respective values was based on conflicting evidence 
indicates that the parties were in doubt as to the value of 
their property and that they meant what they said when they 
provided that both the division of their property and the 
monthly payments were "for and in consideration of the 
permanent and lasting division and settlement of all their 
property rights of every kind and nature .... " Moreover. 
in the absence of the agreement the court could have awarded 
plaintiff all of the community property and less alimony. 
and just as in the Dexter case, she was entitled to agree in-
stead to a substantially equal division of the community prop-
erty in exchange for support and maintenance payments that 
could not be reduced. 
[~b, Sb] When as in this case the parties have clearly ex- \ 
pressed their •• purpose of fixing and adjusting their personal 
and property rights," have provided that the provision for 
alimony is •• for and in consideration of the permanent and 
lasting division and settlement of all their property rights 
of every kind and nature," and the wife has waived "all 
right to future maintenance and support . . . , except as 
herein otherwise expressly provided," the conclusion is in-
escapable that they have made the provisions for support and 
maintenance an integral and inseparable part of their prop-
erty settlement agreement. With such conclusive evidence of 
integration, the provisions for support and maintenance or 
alimony would be subject to modification only if the parties 
expressly so provided. (See Flynn v. Flynn, supra, 42 Cal. 
2d 55, 61, and cases cited.) The court may not, however, 
"insert what has been omitted" (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858) and 
) 
) 
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thereby abrogate the clearly expressed agreement of the 
parties. 
[9] Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in failing 
to find defendant in contempt of court and in conditionally 
suspending the issuance of a writ of execution. There was 
evidence that defendant had been twice married after his 
divorce from plaintiff, that he had no assets other than the 
income from his medical practice upon which an execution 
could be levied, and that he had suffered a partial stroke 
necessitating loss of time from his practice. On the basis 
of this evidence and evidence of defendant's income and 
expenditures the trial court was justified in finding that de-
fendant, "while in arrears, is not in contempt of Court," and 
that "the financial obligations of said defendant have been 
of such a nature so as to have prevented the payment of the 
sum of $500.00 each and every month." 
With respect to the question of execution, both parties rely 
on Lohman v. Lohman, 29 Ca1.2d 144 (173 P.2d 657], and 
Di Corpo v. Di Corpo, 33 Ca1.2d 195 [200 P.2d 529), dealing 
with the right to execution on an instaUment judgment under 
the provisions of section 681 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
It was stated in the Lohman case that" Although issuance of 
execution upon a judgment requiring monthly payments may 
be denied upon equitable grounds, proof that the installments 
have accrued within five years6 establishes a prima facie right 
to execution and the burden is east upon the judgment debtor 
to establish facts justifying an order denying the writ" 
(29 Ca1.2d at 150) and in the Di Corpo case that "Thus, upon 
proof by plaintiff that instaUments have accrued within 
five years, the burden was upon defendant to establish facts 
justifying an order recalling the writ!' (33 Ca1.2d at 201.) 
We have concluded, however, that it is unnecessary to de· 
termine whether defendant has met the burden referred to 
in these cases. 
Prior to 1951, section 139 of the CiVl1 Code provided that 
HWhere a divorce is granted for an offense of the husband, 
the court may compel him to provide for the maintenance 
of the children of the marriage, and to make such suitable 
allowance to the wife for her support, during her life or for 
a shorter period as the court may deem just, having regard to 
the circllmstances of the parties respectively .... " An order 
·Code of Civil Procedure section 681 was amended in 1955 to provide 
for a 10'year instead of a 5'year period. 
) 
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for support payments under this section was enforceable 
by execution pursuant to section 1007 of the Oode of Oivil 
Procedure, which provides, "Whenever an order for the pay-
ment of a sum of money is made by a court pursuant to the 
provisions of this code, it may be enforced by execution in 
the same manner as if it were a judgment." 
[10] In 1951, however, section 139 was amended, and in 
addition to other changes not relevant to this proceeding, a 
provision was added that orders thereunder "may be enforced 
by the court by execution or by such other' order or orders 
as in its discretion [the trial court] may from time to time 
deem necessary." Under this provision the trial court now has 
discretion to determine in each case whether execution is an 
appropriate remedy for enforcing its order. In the present 
case the court found on sufficient evidence that to permit the 
issuance and enforcement of a writ of execution would dis- ! 
credit defendant. professionally and impair his ability to make 
the monthly payments and discharge the arrearages. Accord-
ingly, it did not abuse its discretion in conditioning the 
issuance of execution on defendant's noncompliance with 
its order to discharge the arrearages in installments. 
To the extent that the judgment modifies the provisions 
of the propert.y settlement agreement and the interlocutory 
and final decree based thereon it is reversed. In all other 
respects the judgment is affirmed. Each side shall bear its 
own costs on this appeal. 
Gibson, O. J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
OARTER, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached in the 
majority opinion. I do not, however, agree with the reasoning. 
leading thereto. 
I said in my dissent in Def£ter v. Def£ter, 42 Oal.2d 36, 46 
[265 P.2d 873], that this court" ••• had an opportunity 
to clarify the law so that stability might be given to property 
settlement agreements and agreements for support and main-
tenance. Not only do the majority holdings in these three 
cases [Fox v. Fox, 42 Oal.2d 49 (265 P.2d 881); Def£ter v. 
Dezter, 4:2 Oa1.2d 36 (265 P.2d 873); Flynn v. Plynn,42 
Ca1.2d 55 (265 P.2d 865)] not settle the law, but they add 
untold confusion." I said in my dissent in the Flynn case 
(42 Ca1.2d 55, 62, 67) that the holding of the majority there 
was an effective trap designed to catch both wary and un-
June 1956) MESSENGER V. MESSENGER 
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wary attorneys who were honestly and conscientiously trying 
to protect their clients' interests, and that it was "absolutely 
impossible for attorneys to lmow whether tllis court will, 
years later, determine that there was an incorporation [of 
the agreement in the judgment of divorce], or order one 
whether or not it was intended at the time of the interlocutory 
decree. " 
The main, and most vicious, error in this and in the Fox, 
Dexter and Flynn cases is the holding that the agreement 
of the parties may now be scrutinized to determine what the 
parties intended when the agreement was executed-whether 
they intended monthly payments as an integral part of a 
property settlement agreement or whether they really in-
tended such periodic payments to be alimony and therefore 
subject to modification later by that court or by another 
court. Even one later determination as to the intent of the 
parties is not sufficient under the holdings in these cases-
if an appellate court so desires it may decide that the parties 
intended the payments to be one or the other, and so on 
ad infinitum. 
In the case under consideration, we have the majority 
reversing the judgment of the trial court insofar as it modified 
the provisions of the "property settlement 8.,,"Teement." The 
trial court had concluded that the monthly payments pro-
vided for were alimony and therefore subject to modification. 
The majority here concludes that the monthly payments 
were an integral part of the property settlement agreement 
and therefore not subject to modification. The following 
statement from the majority opinion leads the way to end-
less litigation between these parties and others in the same 
situation: "In the absence of confl.ictin~ extrinsic evidence 
as to the meaning of the agreement, the trial court's inter-
pretation of it is not binding on this court. (Fox v. Fox, 
42 Ca1.2d 49, 52 [265 P.2d 8811; Estate of Platt, 21 Ca1.2d 
343, 352 [131 P.2d 825].)'~ The error in permitting this 
point to be litigated and relitigated when the parties ob-
viously intended a iinal and complete determination of their 
property rights leads to this result: The trial court here 
concluded that the monthly payments were alimony; the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal concluded that the payments were an 
integrated part of a property settlement agreement and this 
court is now also so holding. By its holdin/!. the case is 
now set at large and there must be a retrial of the matter. 
) 
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On the new trial, other evidence may be forthcoming which 
will have a bearing on what the parties intended when they 
entered into the agreement. If new evidence is introduced 
which shows that the parties thought they were providing 
for alimony or support and maintenance payments for the· 
wife, the trial court may again decide that such payments 
were alimony and subject to modification; the District Court! 
of Appeal might affirm the holding of the trial court, and" 
it is highly probable that this court might again conclude. 
that such payments were an integrated part of a property' 
settlement agreement and again set the case at large for a: 
new trial. This one issue has already been passed upon by: 
the courts of this state four times-once when the divorce 
was granted; again by the trial court when the wife applied' 
for an order of execution; next by the District Court of' 
Appeal, and next, but far from last, by this court. This 
interminable and expensive litigation all stems from the hold- , 
ing of a majority of this court that the question of what·· 
the parties intended when they entered into their agreement' 
is one of fact which may be relitigated at some future time. " 
I have been advised by trial judges from allover the state I 
that they find the rules set forth in the Fox, Dexter and ' 
Flynn cases extremely difficult, if not impossible, to apply 
in the various situations presented to them in actions for . 
divorce. So long as this condition exists, this court will have 
the added burden of endeavoring to correct the honest errors 
made by trial courts in this type of case. This situation', 
could be very easily remedied if this court would formulate' 
definite understandable rules to guide lawyers and the judges 
of the numerous superior courts of this state. ' 
This court has not seen fit to correct its previous errors: 
but, on the contrary, added to the general confusion with 
its holding in the ease under consideration. It is at once 
apparent from a glance at the signatures on the opinions in 
all of these eases that trial judges and attorneys are not' 
the only ones who are confused as to the holdings in the Fox, ~ 
Dexter and Flynn cases. Here, we have Mr. Justice Shenk, 'I', 
who signed M.r. Justice Traynor's opinions in the Fox, Dexter < 
and Flynn eases, dissenting from his opinion herein. In 
passing, it should be mentioned that, in my opinion, Mr. ~ 
Justice Shenk in his dissent correctly applies the rules set : 
forth in the Fox and Flynn cases that the trial court could " 
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agreement and that its conclusion based thereon was supported 
by the evidence and should not be disturbed on appeal.· 
Civil Code, sections 158, 159 and 175, all authorize con-
tracts between husband and wife. Under the statutory law 
it would be a very simple matter for this court to lay down 
understandable and workable rules of law applicable to agree-
ments for property settlement, alimony, and support and 
maintenance in divorce and separate maintenance cases. Such 
rules would permit lawyers properly to advise their clients, 
would permit husbands and wives seeking divorce who are 
honestly and intelligently endeavoring to make a division 
of their property, and arrangements for support and main-
tenance, to do so without fear that such arrangements would 
be later changed by a trial, or an appellate court. There 
appears to me to be no sound reason why contracts between 
such parties should not, in the absence of fraud or over-
reaching, be given the same stability and dignity accorded to 
contracts entered into between persons not so related. 
The rule of law I should like to see in effect in California 
in this type of case is very simple and easy of application. 
'There the parties have entered into an agreement for a 
division of their property, or where one has agreed to give, 
and the other to receive, periodic payments in lieu of a 
division of their property, or in conjunction with a division 
of their property, or for support and maintenance, or alimony, 
the agreement so entered into if approved by the court as 
fair, just and equitable and not the result of any fraud or 
overreaching, should be the sum total of the parties' right!' 
and liabilities and should not be subject to modification 
unless the parties have expressly provided for a later modi-
fication, or unless a subsequent modifying agreement is exe-
cuted by them. 
In a divorce action, when the parties have entered into an 
ngreement involving their property rights, the court should 
inquire into the facts surrounding the execution thereof to 
ascertain whether there has been any fraud or overreaching. 
The court should also inquire into the terms and provision!'> 
of the agreement to determine whether it is fair, just and 
equitable. When the court approves the contract as fair, just 
and equitable and determines that there has been no fraud 
-In the Dexter ease it should be remembered that the majority, while 
holding that the trial court could determine the character of the monthly 
payments involved, affirmed the trial court's action in 8ustaining de-
fendant's objeetion to the introduction of evidence on that issue. 
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or overreaching, the matter should be forever concluded and 
the parties bound by the terms of their agreement. " 
Stated simply, the foregoing proposed rules mean only' 
this: That the parties have entered into an agreement which 
the court has approved as fair and equitable and not the 
result of fraud or overreaching; that such agreement should 
be accorded the same finality and dignity as contracts entered 
into between strangers. 
If the above rules were in effect in California, the probe: 
lem of incorporation would also be a very simple one. In 
my opinion there is no incorporation of an agreement in a 
divorce decree unless that agreement has been copied therein 
in haectlerba, or its substance is stated therein, or unless a 
copy of the agreement is attached physically to the decree 
of divorce and referred to as being a part thereof. When 
there has been an effective incorporation of the agreement 
in the judgment, the agreement is merged therein and the 
effect is to make the remedy one upon the judgment rather 
than by separate action on the agreement itself. Incorpora-
tion should have absolutely no effect so far as the parties' 
agreement is concerned. The agreement is a contract and 
its terms should govern. If the decree orders compliance 
with the terms of the agreement which has been incorporated 
in the judgment, the only result should be in the form of 
remedy available to the party seeking to enforce the judg-
ment. (Plummer v. Superior Court, 20 Ca1.2d 158 [124 P.2d· 
5].) 
It is at once apparent that if the above rules had been 
applied in the instant case, we would not have the chaos 
and confusion here present. Here it is evident that the·j 
parties intended a final settlement of their property rights , 
at the time the agreement was executed. The holding of the i 
majority here destroys the effectiveness of the agreement : 
solemnly entered into by the parties and leaves their property 
and rights in a state of uncertainty and confusion. 
I would therefore reverse the judgment and order. 
SHENK, J., Dissenting.-I am unable to agree with that 
portion of the opinion which holds that the alimony pay-
ments to the wife were integrated in the property settlement 
agreement and were therefore not subject to modification as 
provided in section 139 of the Civil Code. 
A property settlement agreement should be construed as 
any other agreement. Here the parties were dealing at arm'8 
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length and were represented by counsel in the preparation 
of the agreement. They are presumed to mean what they 
said in that instrument and the words they have used are 
to be taken in their ordinary and legal meaning. Here both 
meanings are the same. The problem in each ease is to 
ascertain the intention of the parties by the language they 
have used. The parties set about to settle a "permanent 
and lasting" division of their "property rights" whether 
"separate or community." Permanent alimony payments do 
110t fall within either category and as a general rule must 
be dealt with subject to the power of the court to modify 
them in accordance with the provisions of section 139 of the 
Civil Code. Where in the agreement there is a clear inten-
tion to waive them or to integrate and settle them as part 
and parcel of all marital and property rights, the right of 
1he parties to so contract is recognized. Here, as properly 
found by the court, there was no such intention. The parties 
repeatedly and with obvious design used the word "alimony" 
in their agreement. That word ordinarily means an allow-
ance made to the wife by her husband for her support after 
a dissolution of their marriage by divorce. It is used fre-
quently in our statutes as incorporated in our official codes. 
For example, it is specifically employed in sections 137, 140 
and 142 of the Civil Code. In our decisional law it has been 
used repeatedly in its ordinary sense. It must be assumed 
that it was used in its ordinary sense throughout this pro-
ceeding. It was first used by the parties in their agreement, 
which provides that the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 
$500 per month as "alimony" for her "support and main-
tenance" and provides that these payments shall continue 
"until the wife dies or remarries." Then in her complaint 
for divoree the wife asked for an award of "alimony" in 
this same sum. She prayed that the property settlement 
agreement be approved and made a part of the deeree and 
that the court order the defendant to pay her $500 per month 
for her care, maintenance and support IC as therein agreed." 
The interlocutory decree approved the property settlement 
agreement and incorporated it by reference in the judgment 
and ordered that the defendant pay to the plaintiff $500 
per month for her "care, maintenanee and support • • • as 
agreed in said property settlement agreement . • . until the 
plaintiff dies or remarries. . . ." The word IC support" as 
used in section 139 of the Civil Code of eourse means alimony. 
The final deeree of divorce specifically states that "wherein 
) 
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said interlocutory decree makes any provision for aHmo' 
[it] is hereby made binding on the parties affec 
thereby as if herein set forth in full." Those decrees hav .. 
long since become final. 
The use by the parties and by the court of the descriptive 
and meaningful term and phrases "alimony," "care, main; 
tenance and support" and "until the plaintiff dies or re~ 
marries" should not be disregarded and should be determina~. 
tive in support of the findings and conclusions of the trial.: 
court in the present proceeding. . 
But this court now says, as a matter of law, that the 
parties did not mean what they said when they used the. 
word "alimony" in their agreement, and that the trial court' 
did not mean what it said in its divorce decrees, and that 
the findings and conclusions in the present proceeding are 
without support in the record. If the agreement was without 
ambiguity, as both parties contend, the trial court had the 
power in the first instance to declare from its language 1 
alone the intention of the parties, and its determination should I 
not be set aside unless it is unreasonable. A construction of 
the agreement on that theory alone is reasonable. However, 
each party contends that the agreement is unambiguous in 
his or her favor, and this is one test of ambiguity. The fnct 
that the parties themselves each ascribe different meanings 
to the words used indicates the existence of an ambiguity. 
(Chastain v. Belmont, 43 Ca1.2d 45, 51 [271 P.2d 498J; 
California Emp. Stab. Com. v. Walters, 62 Cal.App.2d 554, e 
559 [149 P.2d 17].) . 
Notwithstanding her contention that the agreement is un-
ambiguous in her favor the plaintiff at the hearing of the 
present proceeding requested the court to take extrinsic evi-
dence to ascertain the intention of the contracting parties 
as to the alimony payments. In so doing she was met by 
the construction of the agreement in the prior divorce pro-
ceedings to the unmistakable effect that alimony was not 
integrated in the agreement. However in compliance with 
her request the trial court took extrinsic evidence. This 
it had the right to do in aid of the interpretation of the 
agreement when ambiguity is present or questionable. (Tuttle 
v. Tuttle, 38 Ca1.2d 419, 421 [240 P.2d 587] ; Flynn v. Flynn, 
42 Ca1.2d 55, 60 [265 P.2d 865] ; Fox v. Fox, 42 Ca1.2d 49, 
52 [265 P.2d 881].) 
Having before it the terms of the agreement, the divorce 
decrees and the extrinsic evidence, the trial court found and 
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concluded that alimony as such was not intended to be in-
tegrated in the agreement and was not affected by the pro-
vision therein waiving "all right to future maintenance and 
support . . . except as herein otherwise provided." The ex-
ception could have reference only to the alimony which is 
"otherwise provided." In my opinion the record fully sup-
ports the findings and the conclusion of the trial court that 
the alimony payments were modifiable. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-Husband and wife are as free 
as other competent persons to contract with each other. (Civ. 
Code, §§ 158, 159.) There is no reason why they cannot enter 
into a property settlement agreement which includes a pro-
vision for alimony, as such, which shall be subject, within 
agreed limits, to control by the court. For example,the 
parties could agree to a maximum limit or to a minimum limit 
or to both maximum and minimum limits, or they could in-
clude a cost-of-living sliding scale. the exact amount of con-
tributions in each case to be fixed by the court if the parties 
failed to agree. They could also provide for security to guar-
antee maximum payments or they could agree that the court 
might order complete termination of alimony upon the showing 
of the occurrence of some casualty. 
A contract made by competent parties, and valid nnder 
the law of contracts, dot's not for some mysterious reason be-
come subject to alteration in or disregard of its terms merely 
because the contracting parties are or were husband and wife. 
But when the contract by its terms provides for the payment 
of alimony the ordinary meaning of the word suggests that 
the amount of alimony shall remain subject to control of 
the court unless that primary meaning is expressly negated 
or limited by the contract. Changing the amount of alimony 
payments obviously is not an alteration of the contract where 
the contract provides for "alimony" and does not prohibit 
such changes. 
Here, I cannot hold that as a matter of law the contract 
is not subject to the interpretation given it by the trial court. 
That contract was not in truth made a part of the decree of 
divorce. The majority opinion states that "The decree ap-
proved and i'TIcorporated by refere'TIce the provisions of the 
agreement and expressly ordered defendant to pay $500 per 
month 'as agreed in said property settlement agreement.' " 
(Italics added.) But, as I have heretofore pointed out 
) 
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(Flynn v. Flynn (1954),42 CaI.2d 55, 61-62 [265 P.2d 865]) 
the simple fact is that an agreement cannot be made a part 
of a judgment unless it is in truth incorporated in the judg-
ment so that when the judgment is copied in the judgment 
book the whole of the judgment, necessarily including the 
agreement which is a part of it, is set forth word for word. 
" 'In no case is a judgment effectual for any purpose until 
entered.' (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.) To enter a judgment 
means to copy it in the' judgment book' so that it becomes a 
permanent and public record (see Code Civ. Proc., § 668). 
so that he who reads may know its content. Any portion of 
a judgment not entered in the judgment book would be 
ineffectual for any purpose. If the clerk by error omitted 
to enter any part of a judgment which had been filed, the 
error of the ministerial officer could be corrected; but if he 
has performed his duty and the judgment as entered is truly 
the judgment as rendered, and that judgment has become 
final, then neither this court nor any other court or person 
has power to add words to the language of that judgment." 
(Flynn v. Flynn, supra.) 
Inasmuch as the agreement was not incorporated in the 
decree, the trial court's determination in the light of the 
entire record that the order for payment of $500 monthly 
was in the nature of an award of alimony, should be upheld. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
